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I. Introduction 
Everyone wants to have cell phone reception wherever they 
go. Whether it is to make a call, send a text, receive an email, or 
browse the Internet, our appetite for constant connectivity seems 
insatiable. Of course, cell phone reception is not a natural 
phenomenon that just springs up by itself, but instead requires a 
vast array of antennae and towers, sometimes as dense as one for 
every ten square miles.1 While these towers make this ubiquitous 
and pervasive technology possible, the placement of these towers 
is often a controversial matter, particularly in residential 
communities with regulatory zoning authority over such 
matters.2 Thus, it seems that everyone wants to have cell phone 
reception but no one wants cell phone towers. With the passage of 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and 
Application of “Personal Wireless Service Facility” Provision of Federal 
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(C)(ii), 38 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 379 § 2 
(2009) (describing generally how cell phones work and stating that “[c]ities and 
regions are divided into cells, typically 10 square miles, each containing a base 
station,” which is usually a tower or antenna of some sort); Pinney v. Nokia, 
Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 439–40 (4th Cir. 2005) (describing generally how cell phones 
work); Marshall Brain, Jeff Tyson & Julia Layton, How Cell Phones Work, 
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone10.htm/printable (last visited 
June 1, 2013) (describing how cell phones work) (cited in Buckman Annotation 
and Pinney) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See, e.g., T-Mobile v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 799–800 (6th Cir. 
2012) (describing a contentious township board meeting where several residents 
expressed concern regarding an “ugly tower” that would be placed in their “back 
yard[s]” with “emissions harming children”). 
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the Telecommunications Act of 19963 (TCA or the Act), Congress 
attempted to resolve this inherent tension with 47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7),4 which, in part, provides that local zoning authorities 
“shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting” personal 
wireless facilities, including towers.5 This statutory provision 
prohibits localities from instituting blanket bans on all cell phone 
towers—obviously—but also prohibits effective, de facto bans. 
The trouble, however, is that the courts do not agree on just what 
that actually means. 
The circuits have split on three different issues surrounding 
the interpretation of this clause, subsection (B)(i)(II). The first 
circuit split is the threshold issue: whether a single denial of a 
cell tower permit can indicate an underlying policy that is an 
effective prohibition. Taking the narrowest reading of subsection 
(B)(i)(II), the Fourth Circuit has said that this provision only 
applies to blanket bans and can never be applied to an individual 
zoning denial.6 However, every other circuit that has addressed 
this question has ruled that, under the right conditions, a single 
denial can be indicative of an effective ban on all cell phone 
towers.7  The question, then, shifts to identifying those right 
conditions. A general two-pronged analysis has emerged among 
the circuits outside of the Fourth. First, the cell phone company 
needs to show a significant gap in coverage that the proposed 
tower can remedy. Second, the court will look into the feasibility 
of other alternative tower sites. If there is a need for the tower, 
and the most feasible location is rejected by the locality, most 
circuits (outside of the Fourth, of course) would consider this an 
effective prohibition.8 
The next two circuit splits revolve around this two-pronged 
analysis. The second circuit split involves the interpretation of 
                                                                                                     
 3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 4. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2012). For the duration of this Note, all in-text 
statutory cites are to 47 U.S.C. unless otherwise provided. Also, all in-text cites 
to subsections (such as (B)(i)(II) or (B)(v)) relate to subsections of § 332(c)(7) 
unless otherwise provided. 
 5. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
 6. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 7. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 8. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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“significant gap.” The Second and Third Circuits have ruled that 
there is no significant gap in coverage if at least one provider can 
serve the area with existing facilities (one-provider rule).9 The 
First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, as well as the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission), have all 
rejected this interpretation and instead judge a significant gap 
with respect to an individual service provider’s own coverage 
area, not to cellular reception for just any company (own-coverage 
rule).10 The third and final circuit split relates to the appropriate 
standards for considering other feasible tower locations. The First 
and Seventh Circuits consider all factors in judging alternative 
sites (no-alternative rule).11 On the other hand, the Second, 
Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits only consider the factors on 
which the zoning authority based its initial denial (least-intrusive 
rule).12 
This Note seeks to untangle this triple knot of interrelated 
circuit splits, analyzing and critiquing the various circuits’ 
positions with particular emphasis on the underlying policies of 
subsection (B)(i)(II) as well as the fundamental tension that 
necessitated this statutory provision—everyone wants reception, 
but no one wants towers. Following this introductory Part, Part II 
provides a brief overview of the TCA and describes the underlying 
collective action problem regarding cell phone towers. That Part 
also includes an in-depth analysis of § 332(c)(7) and the policies 
and structure it establishes regarding tower siting. Part III lays 
out each of the three circuit splits in greater detail, explaining 
each possible answer to the three questions. Finally, Part IV 
critiques each of the six positions on the circuit splits, seeking to 
find a resolution that is most faithful to the text, policies, 
structure, pragmatic concerns, and legislative intent behind 
§ 332(c)(7).  
Ultimately, this Note reaches the conclusion that the two-
pronged analysis is preferable to the Fourth Circuit’s approach.13 
Also, within that framework, a significant gap should be 
                                                                                                     
 9. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 10. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 11. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 12. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
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determined with respect to an individual carrier’s coverage, not 
just the first carrier’s coverage (in other words, the own-coverage 
rule over the one-provider rule)14 and the quality of the site 
should be judged by the factors upon which the zoning board 
based its denial (in other words, least-intrusive rule over the no-
alternative rule).15 
II. Background Law 
This Part will provide general information regarding the 
collective action problems that plague the issue of cell phone 
tower siting. Specifically, the not-in-my-back-yard phenomenon is 
particularly pervasive in this field. Then, after a brief look at the 
major provisions of the TCA, this Part will conclude with an 
examination of the text of § 332(c)(7) as well as an analysis of the 
siting regime that it establishes. This, in particular, will focus on 
the local–national balance that is struck as well as draw some 
helpful analogies to administrative and agency law. 
A. Collective Action Problems, Not-in-My-Back-Yard, and Cell 
Phone Towers 
A collective action problem is one in which the group as a 
whole would benefit from a solution, but no one person has the 
individual self-interest motivations to pursue that solution 
without assurances that every other person will be on board as 
well.16 Such problems occur in the provision of public goods, 
which are goods that are both nonrivalrous (meaning that one’s 
enjoyment does not necessarily preclude another’s enjoyment) 
and nonexcludable (meaning that there is no practical way to 
prevent another’s enjoyment).17 To overcome such collective 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra Part IV.B. 
 15. See infra Part IV.C. 
 16. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS 
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (“Indeed, unless the number of individuals 
in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device 
to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.”). 
 17. See id. at 14–15 (defining public goods). 
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action problems, there usually needs to be a form of coercion or 
some “other special device” to make individuals follow their 
greater, common interests rather than their immediate, more 
individualized interests.18  
The issue of siting a cell phone tower in an area without any 
reception is an example of a collective action problem. The public 
good is cell phone reception, even though, at first glance, it may 
not seem like a public good. Certainly one cannot use a cell phone 
without first paying fees to a private carrier, thus excluding 
noncustomers. But this only makes cell phone service an 
excludable, nonpublic good. What we are concerned with here, 
however, is not so much the cellular service itself but the ability 
to have that service should you chose to pay the fees. Siting a 
tower in a “dead zone” allows for cell phone reception to reach 
everyone within range, which is the necessary precursor for the 
purchase and use of the nonpublic good, cell phone service.19 With 
this distinction made, it is clear that reception is a public good. 
The fact that one person has reception in a given area does not 
diminish another’s reception nearby, thus making it 
nonrivalrous. Also, if A were to have reception, there is nothing 
that can be done practically to take away A’s reception without 
also taking away B’s as well; thus, reception is also 
nonexcludable.  
One can generally assume that people in a “dead zone” would 
probably prefer to have cellular reception. This, of course, would 
require towers, which usually are unpopular in residential areas, 
specifically because of a particular variant of the general 
collective action problem: the not-in-my-back-yard phenomenon, 
or NIMBY.20 This refers to instances in which “local citizens who 
                                                                                                     
 18. Id. at 2. Olson also theorized that groups that are sufficiently small can 
overcome collective action problems without such devices. See id. at 53–60 
(describing collective action problems and small-group dynamics). 
 19. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing generally how cell 
phone towers work). 
 20. See, e.g., David W. Hughes, When NIMBYs Attack: The Heights to 
Which Communities Will Climb to Prevent the Siting of Wireless Towers, 23 J. 
CORP. L. 469, 482–83 (1998) (describing NIMBY as “the phenomenon of local 
citizens who desire the benefit of essential infrastructure (e.g., nursing homes 
and wireless telecommunications facilities), but want them placed in locations 
other than their own neighborhoods or communities” (citations omitted)); see 
also Robert Long, Note, Allocating the Aesthetic Costs of Cellular Tower 
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desire the benefit of essential infrastructure . . . , but want it 
placed in locations other than their own neighborhoods.”21 
In the case of cell phone towers, the reported cases 
demonstrate that phrase “not in my back yard” is particularly 
fitting. For example, in T-Mobile Central, LLC v. West 
Bloomfield,22 the Sixth Circuit reviewed facts from a contentious 
township meeting where “several of the concerned citizens and 
members of the Board specifically mentioned their backyards,” 
including statements such as: 
I need to know if a resident says, you put an ugly tower in my 
backyard and you potentially decrease my property value; my 
backyard is kind of where they’re going to put this thing; but 
the final word is, would you want one of these cell towers in 
what would be, if I build a house there or build houses there, 
in my backyard?; would you want that in your backyard; there 
will be towers and towers and pretty soon I’ll have Disneyland 
in my backyard.23 
These statements vividly demonstrate the high tensions that 
usually accompany a zoning board decision regarding a new cell 
phone tower as well as the aptness of the name, not-in-my-back-
yard. These also show the fundamental tension that underlies 
this whole issue: most everyone wants cell reception wherever 
they go, but no one wants to pay the costs associated with it.24 
One should not lose sight of the fact that the NIMBY sentiment is 
nothing if not sympathetic. Not only does a tower nearby have 
potential pecuniary effects on home values,25 but it also has 
aesthetic and sentimental effects as well. People simply tend to 
                                                                                                     
Expansion: A Workable Regulatory Regime, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 389 
(describing NIMBY as “the desire of citizens to benefit from essential 
infrastructure, such as hazardous waste disposal facilities, without bearing the 
cost of such facilities in their own neighborhoods” (citations omitted)). 
 21. Hughes, supra note 20, at 482 (citations omitted). 
 22. 691 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 23. Id. at 800 n.4 (collecting comments from the minutes of the Board 
meeting (brackets omitted)). 
 24. Specifically, the cost can be conceptualized as “visual pollution” or the 
fact that the “tower kills the view.” John Copeland Nagle, Cell Phone Towers as 
Visual Pollution, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 537, 537 (2009) 
(describing one resident’s objection to a tower being placed near his home). 
 25. See, e.g., T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 800 n.4 (referencing property value). 
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be attached to the view from their window.26 The problem is, 
however, people are also attached to their cell phones. This is also 
where the collective action logic can provide a solution. Mancur 
Olson argued that such splits between common and individual 
interests regarding public goods could be resolved through 
“coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in 
their common interest.”27 While local zoning boards have not been 
coerced into allowing cell phone towers, Congress did pass the 
TCA, which included provisions that operate as a “special device” 
in the siting of cellular facilities. 
B. Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) 
The TCA was “an omnibus overhaul of the federal regulation 
of communications companies”28 and extensively revised the 
Telecommunications Act of 1934.29 It sought to “provide a pro-
competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to 
accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced 
telecommunications and information technologies and services to 
all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to 
competition.”30 The major provisions include (1) prohibiting state 
and local regulations that hinder the provision of 
telecommunications services,31 (2) giving the FCC specific 
authority to preempt such state and local regulations,32 
(3) providing for what would later lead to the Universal Service 
                                                                                                     
 26. See supra note 24 (describing one resident’s objection to a tower being 
placed near his home). 
 27. OLSON, supra note 16, at 2. 
 28. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 637 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 29. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 30. H. REP. No. 104-458 at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124. 
 31. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 253(a), 110 
Stat. 56, 70 (1996) (“No State or local statute or regulation . . . may prohibit or 
have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate 
or intrastate telecommunications service.”). 
 32. See id. § 253(d), 110 Stat. at 70−71 (giving the FCC authority to 
preempt such regulations “to the extent necessary to correct such violation or 
inconsistency”). 
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Fund,33 (4) mandating “interconnection” between 
telecommunications carriers,34 (5) eliminating some ownership 
restrictions on radio and television stations,35 and (6) various 
provisions regarding pornography, indecency, and depiction of 
violence on various telecommunications platforms, including the 
Internet.36  
Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, the Act also 
provided for a new federal–local cell phone tower siting regime, 
now codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).37 This section does not 
explicitly preempt local zoning authority with respect to cell 
phone towers. Indeed, the section preserves it, but with five 
exceptions,38 three substantive and two procedural. These are 
federally imposed limitations on local zoning authority and 
operate as Olson’s “special device” to address the collective action 
issues.39 The first, of course, is the subject of this Note: local 
zoning boards cannot institute policies that “prohibit or have the 
effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.”40 
                                                                                                     
 33. See id. § 254, 110 Stat. at 71–75 (establishing principles and policies for 
universal service activities to expand telecommunications services to 
underserved sectors such as rural areas, low-income consumers, schools, etc.); 
see also 47 C.F.R. Part 54 (containing various regulations regarding universal 
service). 
 34. See Telecommunications Act §§ 251–52, 110 Stat. at 61–70 (requiring 
various forms of interconnection between the systems of market competitors and 
providing negotiation and arbitration procedures to force such interconnection). 
 35. See e.g., id. § 202(a), 110 Stat. at 110 (requiring the FCC to 
“eliminate[e] any provisions limiting the number of AM or FM broadcast 
stations which may be owned or controlled by one entity nationally”); id. 
§ 202(c), 110 Stat. at 111 (requiring the FCC to “eliminate[e] the restrictions on 
the number of television stations that a person or entity may directly or 
indirectly own . . . nationwide”). 
 36. See id. §§ 501–61, 110 Stat. at 133–43 (providing for various 
prohibitions and restrictions on indecent, obscene, and violent content on cable 
television and the Internet). But see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) 
(striking down several portions of the Act relating to Internet pornography as 
violative of the First Amendment). 
 37. See § 704, 110 Stat. at 151. 
 38. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012) (“Except as provided in this 
paragraph, nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State 
or local government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the 
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service 
facilities.”); see also § 332(c)(7)(B) (providing the five exceptions). 
 39. OLSON, supra note 16, at 2. 
 40. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
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Second, localities cannot “unreasonably discriminate among 
providers of functionally equivalent services.”41 Third, localities 
cannot regulate tower sites based on health or environmental 
concerns regarding radio waves if the sites comply with FCC 
regulations.42 As for the two procedural limitations, zoning 
boards must handle cell phone tower site applications “within a 
reasonable period of time”43 and any denials of tower sites must 
be “in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in 
a written record.”44 Finally, as a means to enforce these 
limitations through civil litigation, a service provider may file an 
“expedited” action in “any court of competent jurisdiction” if any 
of these provisions have been violated.45 
What is particularly interesting about the § 332(c)(7) regime 
is that it allows the substantive decision-making regarding tower 
siting to remain largely in local hands, but still provides a federal 
procedural check on the system so as to ensure growth of the 
nation’s cellular infrastructure.46 While one could easily view this 
as Congress’s way of “splitting the baby” between local and 
federal control of the issue,47 this accurate yet glib 
characterization is much too simple and hides the most 
innovative portions of the Act. To fully understand § 332(c)(7), 
one must not only keep in mind the local–federal distinction, but 
                                                                                                     
 41. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I). 
 42. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv) (“No State or local government or instrumentality 
thereof may regulate the placement, construction, and modification of personal 
wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio 
frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the 
Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.”). 
 43. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). 
 44. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). 
 45. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 
 46. See, e.g., Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc’ns Enters., Inc. 173 
F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[Section] 332(c)(7) is a deliberate compromise 
between two competing aims—to facilitate nationally the growth of wireless 
telephone service and to maintain substantial local control over siting of 
towers.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Berger, Efficient Wireless Tower Siting: An 
Alternative to Section 332(c)(7) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 TEMP. 
ENVTL. L & TECH. J. 83, 84 (2004) (“Section 332(c)(7) is an earnest, but 
ultimately problematic congressional attempt to ‘split the baby’ between 
wireless providers that need towers to expand their networks and some local 
zoning boards and residents that view the proliferation of towers as an invasion 
of aesthetically displeasing technology upon their homes and lives.”). 
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also the substantive–procedural distinction. The Act only 
intervenes in the actual substance of the decisions with the three 
limitations listed above. The rest, though, is left in the hands of 
the zoning authorities in each locality, who must also comply 
with the two procedural requirements of reasonable time and 
substantial evidence. Thus, for the most part, § 332(c)(7) governs 
not what decisions are made, but rather how they are made.48 In 
other words, § 332(c)(7) does not answer the collective action 
problem, but provides a way—or “special device”49—to address 
the collective action problem. 
This hybrid system has been described by at least one scholar 
as a form of “process preemption” because it federally imposes 
“substantive and procedural constraints on the local land use 
process.”50 Section 332(c)(7) does not directly mandate any 
particular decision on the merits of a tower siting, but rather only 
constrains the process by which that decision is reached. 51 Such a 
structure has distinct advantages over substantive federal 
regulation by an agency. First, it allows a jurisdictional balance 
on a traditionally local issue—land-use zoning—that also 
happens to have substantial national import—the need for fully 
functioning cellular infrastructure.52 Second, this process also 
                                                                                                     
 48. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Wireless Telecommunications, Infrastructure 
Security, and the NIMBY Problem, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 464 (2005) 
(describing how the § 332(c)(7) regime “operates not through affirmative federal 
rules, but rather through oversight of the operation of state and local land use 
decisions”); Robert B. Foster & Mitchell A. Carrel, Tell Me What You Really 
Think: Judicial Review of Land Use Decisions on Cellular Telecommunications 
Facilities Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 37 URB. LAW. 551, 552 
(2005) (“The TCA does not completely preempt local zoning authority, but 
instead places certain restrictions on the authority of local bodies to regulate the 
zoning of telecommunications service facilities.”); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, 
Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 290 
(2011) (“This framework empowers local governments to make primary siting 
decisions, subject to federal constraints on the decisionmaking process.”). 
 49. OLSON, supra note 16, at 2. 
 50. Ostrow, supra note 48, at 290. 
 51. See id. (“This framework empowers local governments to make primary 
siting decisions, subject to federal constraints on the decisionmaking process.”). 
 52. See id. at 293 (describing how the “hybrid federal–local framework 
accounts for the interjurisdictional nature of a federal siting policy, effectively 
balancing national and local land use priorities”); id. at 317 (“[T]he TCA’s 
Telecommunications Siting Policy utilizes a mix of regulatory actors to balance 
national communication goals with legitimate local siting concerns.” (footnote 
1992 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1981 (2013) 
allows for substantive changes in the outcomes of decisions (that 
is, more zoning approvals for cell phone towers), but in an open 
and public way that is consistent and legitimate.53 Instead of 
federally promulgated administrative rules regulating tower 
siting in all localities across the country,54 the decisions would 
still be made at the local level, perhaps leading to more public 
acceptance. For example, under this regime, it could not be said 
that “Washington bureaucrats” were forcing the small town to 
suffer the unsightly tower (or at least not directly forcing). 
However, the § 332(c)(7) limitations could still tip the odds more 
in favor of the placement of the tower. Moreover, with the 
procedural requirements (such as reasonable time55 and 
substantial evidence on a written record56), cell phone providers 
applying for tower approval will not be subject to long delays and 
unexplained denials. These unfortunate possibilities, if allowed to 
occur, could call into question the motives of the zoning 
authorities and give the impression that the providers are only 
getting the runaround and not a fair decision on the merits.57  
                                                                                                     
omitted)). 
 53. See id. at 293 (“[B]y placing procedural constraints on the local 
decision-making process . . . Process Preemption increases the legitimacy, 
consistency, and public acceptance of controversial siting decisions.”). 
 54. This, in fact, was an alternative considered by Congress. The original 
House version of the Act would have established a negotiated rulemaking 
committee within the FCC to promulgate a set of regulations with which local 
zoning boards would have to comply. See H. REP. NO. 104-204, at 25 (1995), 
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 10 (“Pursuant to subchapter III of title 5, 
United States Code, the Commission shall establish a negotiated rulemaking 
committee to negotiate and develop a proposed policy to comply with the 
requirements of this paragraph.”). 
 55. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012) (“A State or local government or 
instrumentality thereof shall act on any request for authorization to place, 
construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a reasonable 
period of time after the request is duly filed with such government or 
instrumentality . . . .”). 
 56. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (“Any decision by a State or local government or 
instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal 
wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial 
evidence contained in a written record.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Eagle, supra note 48, at 493 (“Long delays in making 
determinations not only earn skepticism as to underlying motives with respect 
to the individual applications, but also lend doubt as to whether delays that 
ostensibly are for review of applications in fact are for discrimination among 
providers or for prohibitions on wireless service . . . .”). 
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The procedural preemption characterization is a helpful way 
of understanding the § 332(c)(7) regime, but another metaphor 
may be illustrative as well. Specifically, § 332(c)(7) is highly 
evocative of judicial review of administrative decisions. For 
example, the Act requires that all denials of tower permits be 
supported by “substantial evidence contained in a written 
record.”58 This appears to facilitate, at least in part, the judicial 
review portion of the Act whereby aggrieved service providers can 
petition the federal courts for relief from violations of 
§ 332(c)(7)(B).59 While the Act does not provide an exact definition 
of “substantial evidence,” this phrase does have a well-
established definition in administrative law.60 In fact, the 
legislative history of the Act demonstrates that Congress 
intended this phrase to mean the same as it does in the agency 
context.61 The cases have generally applied the same 
administrative standard.62 Thus, one could view a subsection 
                                                                                                     
 58. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). 
 59. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(v); see also PATRICIA E. SALKIN, 4 AM. LAW. ZONING 
§ 40:27 (5th ed.) (“If judicial review is to be an efficient bulwark against 
arbitrary conduct, such records must be accurate, and reasonably complete.”). 
Local zoning meetings are often informal, and records and transcripts are not 
always rigorously taken as they would be in a court or agency hearing. See id. 
§ 40:1 (generally describing the informal nature of zoning hearings, including 
lack of legally trained members, sporadic legal advice, and inconsistent 
recordkeeping). 
 60. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) 
(“[S]ubstantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
Accordingly, it must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to 
direct a verdict.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
 61. See H. REP. NO. 104-458, at 208 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 223 (“The phrase ‘substantial evidence contained in a written 
record’ is the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cnty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1218 
(11th Cir. 2002) (applying the same “substantial evidence” standard from the 
administrative context); Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 58 (1st 
Cir. 2001) (same); Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 227 F.3d 414, 423 
(6th Cir. 2000) (same); Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 F.3d 403, 
407–08 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 
490, 493–94 (2d Cir. 1999) (same). Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit is again an 
outlier in its interpretation of the Act. See infra Part III.A.1. for another 
anomalous interpretation by the Fourth Circuit. Noting that “[t]he ‘reasonable 
mind’ of a legislator is not necessarily the same as the ‘reasonable mind’ of a 
bureaucrat,” the Fourth Circuit applies a reasonable-legislator standard to the 
definition of substantial evidence for § 332(c)(7) purposes, including 
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(B)(v) petition like a court’s review of an agency action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.63 Again, this underscores the fact 
that the substantive decision-making is still done, within certain 
limitations, by the local zoning board because the reviewing court 
“may neither engage in [its] own fact-finding nor supplant the 
[zoning board’s] reasonable determinations.”64 Rather, the court’s 
role is simply to ensure that the local authorities have complied 
with the handful of procedural and substantive limitations found 
within § 332(c)(7)(B), including subsection (B)(i)(II)’s prohibition 
on bans and effective bans. Thus, with the substantial evidence 
requirements and the opportunity for judicial review, § 332(c)(7) 
can be seen as Congress treating local zoning boards as mini-
agencies.65 The metaphor to federal administrative law is 
particularly helpful when considering one of the circuit splits 
discussed later.66 
                                                                                                     
considerations of popular opinion. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of 
Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 1998). While the court has a point about 
the differences between legislators and bureaucrats, this does not seem to be 
enough to trump the legislative history that clearly and unequivocally states 
that “substantial evidence” is to be given the same definition that it has in the 
administrative context. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 63. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . 
unsupported by substantial evidence . . . .”). 
 64. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 
1999) (citing PrimeCo Pers. Commc’ns, L.P. v. Vill. of Fox Lake, 26 F. Supp. 2d 
1052, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1998)); see also T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Unified Gov’t of 
Wyandotte Cnty., 546 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] reviewing court has 
no power to substitute its own conclusions for those of the fact-finder . . . .” 
(citations and quotations omitted)); Ostrow, supra note 48, at 333 (“Though the 
substantial evidence standard is less deferential than the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review, it does not substitute local judgments with those 
of the judiciary.”). 
 65. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (reviewing factual findings with a 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole standard), and id. § 702 (offering 
right of review to persons suffering legal wrongs), with 47 U.S.C. 
§ 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (requiring that denials be supported by substantial evidence in 
a written record), and id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (providing judicial review for alleged 
violations to any person adversely affected).  
 66. See infra Part IV.C. 
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III. Decisions and Circuit Splits 
Speaking generally about the TCA, the Supreme Court has 
remarked that the Act is “in many important respects a model of 
ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.”67 Section 332(c)(7) is 
no exception to this characterization. Subsection (B)(i)(II) is 
indeed ambiguous in that it does not spell out what it means by 
“the effect of prohibiting.” While there may not be any self-
contradictions within § 332(c)(7) itself, the federal appellate 
courts have conflicting interpretations of just what this crucial 
substantive limitation actually means. The courts first differ as to 
what extent an individual denial of a siting application can 
constitute an effective ban by the local zoning board. From there, 
the circuits split again on two issues regarding how to define such 
an effective ban. The following subparts explain the three splits 
in more detail. For clarification, the table at the end of Part III 
summarizes these three splits and how the various courts have 
answered the questions. 
A. First Split: Can a Single Denial Effectively Prohibit Cell Phone 
Towers? 
The circuits are split on whether a single zoning decision can 
“have the effect of prohibiting” cell phone towers and thus trigger 
subsection (B)(i)(II). The Fourth Circuit has determined that a 
single denial rarely suffices as an effective prohibition, while 
every other circuit that has considered the issue has found that 
even one denial, under the right circumstances, can violate 
subsection (B)(i)(II). 
1. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach: A Blanket Ban on (Only) 
Blanket Bans 
In AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Virginia 
Beach,68 the Fourth Circuit ruled that subsection 
                                                                                                     
 67. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd. 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999). 
 68. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423 
(4th Cir. 1998). 
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(B)(i)(II) operates to prohibit only across-the-board bans on cell 
phone towers and has no effect on individual zoning decisions.69 
Thus, a single denied application from a zoning authority cannot 
violate the Act. Examining the issue in a way that other courts 
have called “strict plain meaning analysis”70 and even a “cramped 
reading,”71 the Fourth Circuit reasoned that  
any reading of subsection (B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection 
to apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local 
authority by mandating approval of all (or nearly all) 
applications, a result contrary to the explicit language of 
section (B)(iii), which manifestly contemplates the ability of 
local authorities to “deny a request.”72 
The court reasoned that its narrow interpretation of subsection 
(B)(i)(II) is “necessary to avoid destroying local authority and to 
reconcile subsection (B)(i)(II) with section (B)(iii),”73 which, as the 
court mentioned, implicitly presumes that local authorities can 
deny requests.74 Thus, because the Act contemplates permissible 
denials, the AT&T court determined that a single denial could 
never be considered a prohibition on personal wireless services.75 
                                                                                                     
 69. See id. at 428 (“The district court . . . held that subsection (B)(i)(II) . . . 
only applies to ‘blanket prohibitions’ and ‘general bans or policies,’ not 
individual zoning decisions. . . . [W]e reach the same conclusion . . . .” (citations 
and quotations omitted)). 
 70. MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 730 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 71. T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir. 
2012).  
 72. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428. 
 73. Id. at 429. 
 74. See id. at 428 (stating that “the explicit language of section (B)(iii) . . . 
manifestly contemplates the ability of local authorities to ‘deny a request’”); see 
also 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (2012) (“Any decision by a State or local 
government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or 
modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by 
substantial evidence contained in a written record.” (emphasis added)). 
 75. See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 
423, 428 (4th Cir. 1998) 
[A]ny reading of subsection (B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection to 
apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local authority 
by mandating approval of all (or nearly all) applications, a result 
contrary to the explicit language of section (B)(iii), which manifestly 
contemplates the ability of local authorities to “deny a request.” 
The obvious fallacy here is that while a single denial can be permissible as 
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In the Fourth Circuit, only “blanket prohibitions” and “general 
bans or policies” can violate subsection (B)(i)(II), but never 
“individual zoning decisions.”76 
While the AT&T decision was fairly rigid in its finding that 
only blanket bans could violate subsection (B)(i)(II), the Fourth 
Circuit has “since recognized . . . the theoretical possibility” that a 
single denial could violate subsection (B)(i)(II) if the only possible 
tower site was denied, but the court cautioned that “such a 
scenario ‘seems unlikely in the real world.’”77 Despite the court’s 
skepticism that such a situation could present itself, the court 
has stated that a provider complaining of a single denial has the 
“heavy burden” of proving that this is “tantamount to a 
prohibition of service.”78 On a few occasions,79 the court has 
favorably cited to a First Circuit case80: “[T]he burden for the 
carrier invoking [subsection (B)(i)(II)] is a heavy one: to show 
from language or circumstances not just that this application has 
been rejected but that further reasonable efforts are so likely to 
be fruitless that it is a waste of time even to try.”81 The Fourth 
Circuit uses this to demonstrate the high hurdle that carriers 
must clear, even though the First Circuit uses another, more 
lenient analysis that the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejects.82 Thus, 
                                                                                                     
contemplated by the statute, this does not mean that all single denials are 
always permissible. This is the critique to be offered in Part IV.A, infra. 
 76. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428. 
 77. USCOC of Va. RSA # 3 v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 343 
F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting 360 Degrees Commc’ns Co. of 
Charlottesville v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211 F.3d 79, 87 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
 78. 360 Degrees Commc’ns Co. of Charlottesville v. Bd. of Supervisors, 211 
F.3d 79, 87–88 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc’ns 
Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 79. See, e.g., id. at 88; New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Fairfax Cnty. 
Bd. of Supervisors, 674 F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 80. See Town of Amherst v. Omnipoint Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 173 F.3d 9 
(1st Cir. 1999). 
 81. Id. at 14. 
 82. Compare Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 
620, 632 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We have concluded that a town’s refusal to permit a 
tower that is needed to fill a significant geographic gap in service, where no 
service at all is offered in the gap, would violate the effective prohibition clause.” 
(citations, quotations, and brackets omitted)), with T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. Fairfax 
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 672 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e specifically 
rejected the standard adopted by other circuits permitting a plaintiff to 
establish merely that its proposed facility constitutes the least intrusive means 
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although the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged the possibility of a 
non-ban effective prohibition, the circuit’s tests are still the most 
demanding and are distinct from the other circuits’ tests. 
Whether or not the Fourth Circuit’s later precedents indicate a 
ban only on blanket prohibitions or perhaps something a shade 
more lenient, other circuits certainly view the Fourth Circuit’s 
position as the strictest.83 
2. Everyone Else’s Approach: A Single Denial Can Constitute an 
Effective Prohibition 
Every other circuit that has considered the question has 
rejected the Fourth Circuit’s strict interpretation of subsection 
(B)(i)(II).84 Instead, the other circuits take a more flexible 
approach. Although not every individual denial represents an 
effective prohibition, a single denial conceivably could under the 
right circumstances; that possibility is not foreclosed.85 Under 
                                                                                                     
to close a significant gap in service.” (citations and quotations omitted)). 
 83. See, e.g., T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. Charter Twp. of W. Bloomfield, 691 
F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The cramped reading of the Fourth Circuit 
requires a blanket ban to trigger a violation of the statute.”). 
 84. All but the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have directly 
considered this issue, and all have reached the opposite conclusion as the 
Fourth Circuit in AT&T. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he denial of a single application can 
constitute a violation of this portion of the Act.”); MetroPCS v. City & Cnty. of 
S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 731 (9th Cir. 2005) (“However, for a variety of reasons, we 
decline to adopt the Fourth Circuit rule on this point.”); Voicestream 
Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty., 342 F.3d 818, 833 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Other 
circuits have determined that the clause is not restricted to blanket bans on cell 
towers, and that the clause may, at times, apply to individual zoning decisions.” 
(quotations and citations omitted)); Second Generation Props., LP v. Town of 
Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 629 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The clause may, at times, apply to 
individual zoning decisions.”); APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 
F.3d 469, 479 (3d Cir. 1999) (“This does not mean, however, that a provider can 
never establish that an individual adverse zoning decision has the ‘effect’ of 
violating § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II).”); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 
640 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Quoting at length from AT&T, the Board argues in 
substance that subsection B(i)(II) must be read as prohibiting only general 
bans. . . . We disagree with this reasoning.” (citations omitted)). 
 85. See, e.g., T-Mobile, 691 F.3d at 805–06 (“The statute itself refers to 
actions that have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless 
services . . . . Not simply prohibiting it, but effectively prohibiting it. Thus, 
actions short of a complete prohibition could have the effect of improperly 
hindering the construction of cellular towers.”). 
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this approach, providers instead have to demonstrate that the 
one denial in question arises from an underlying policy that is so 
against cell phone towers that it has the effect of a ban.86 While 
sitting by appointment on the Ninth Circuit, Judge Cudahy aptly 
summarized the general approach of all other circuits: 
Several circuits have held that, even in the absence of a 
“general ban” on wireless services, a locality can run afoul of 
the TCA’s “effective prohibition” clause if it prevents a wireless 
provider from closing a “significant gap” in service coverage. 
This inquiry generally involves a two-pronged analysis 
requiring (1) the showing of a “significant gap” in service 
coverage and (2) some inquiry into the feasibility of alternative 
facilities or site locations.87 
Although this may seem to complicate the process significantly—
perhaps more so than the subsection’s plain language would 
indicate—the reasoning behind this two-pronged analysis is 
actually quite simple: if a zoning authority in a “dead zone” 
denies a tower at even the best possible location, then that single 
denial is a manifestation of a broader policy that does “have the 
effect of prohibiting the provision of wireless services.”88 
Essentially, if the best site is not good enough for the zoning 
board, then no site will ever be good enough. The next two circuit 
splits regard issues within this two-part test. 
B. Second Split: How Significant of a Gap? 
The second circuit split relates to whether a significant gap 
in coverage must exist for all cell phone providers, or whether an 
individual company’s gap in only their own service would also 
suffice. Consider a hypothetical town in which Verizon has a 
tower that provides its customers with good reception. AT&T, 
however, does not have a tower in the area and thus its 
customers have poor signal. If the local zoning authority denies 
                                                                                                     
 86. See, e.g., APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 479 
(3d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he provider must bring additional proof . . . to demonstrate 
that the denial is representative of a broader policy or circumstance that 
precludes the provision of wireless service.”). 
 87. MetroPCS v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 731 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 88. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (2012). 
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AT&T’s tower application and the provider challenges the denial 
in federal court under subsection (B)(i)(II), can AT&T argue a 
“significant gap” in its own coverage, or does Verizon’s 
preexisting tower prohibit this argument? Thus, the circuits split 
around the issue of whether a significant gap is with respect to 
cellular reception generally or with respect to an individual 
provider. 
1. The One-Provider Rule 
If the above example took place in the Second or Third 
Circuits, AT&T’s challenge would fail due to the “one-provider 
rule.” These circuits have concluded that “once an area is 
sufficiently serviced by a wireless service provider, the right to 
deny applications becomes broader: state and local governments 
may deny subsequent applications without thereby violating 
subsection B(i)(II).”89 The Second and Third Circuits were not 
concerned about unchecked zoning authorities with plenary 
power to deny all subsequent towers because “[t]he right to deny 
applications will still be tempered by subsection B(i)(II), which 
prohibits unreasonable discrimination.”90 In reviewing (and 
ultimately rejecting) the one-provider rule, the Ninth Circuit 
remarked: 
This rule has been touted as proceeding from the consumer’s 
perspective rather than the individual service provider’s 
perspective, which the Third Circuit argues is more in keeping 
with the regulatory goals of the TCA—as long as some 
provider offers service in the area, consumers will be 
adequately served and the TCA’s goal of establishing 
nationwide wireless service will be achieved. Under this view, 
the TCA protects only the individual user’s ability to receive 
service from one provider or another; it does not protect each 
service provider’s ability to maintain full coverage within a 
given market.91 
                                                                                                     
 89. Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999); see 
also APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480 (quoting Willoth). 
 90. Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643; see also APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480 
(quoting Willoth). 
 91. MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731–32 (citations and quotations omitted). 
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Similarly, after an in-depth analysis of the Act’s statutory 
definitions of the various kinds of cellular services,92 the Second 
Circuit stated that:  
[T]he plain focus of the statute is on whether it is possible for a 
user [to have reception]. In our view, therefore, the most 
compelling reading . . . is that local governments may not 
regulate personal wireless service facilities in such a way as to 
prohibit remote users from [having reception].93  
Thus, with this consumer-centric view, it is only natural that the 
Second and Third Circuits would adopt the one-provider rule. 
Although the Fourth Circuit rejects this two-pronged inquiry 
altogether,94 the circuit has implicitly accepted the one-provider 
rule as well, determining that providers’ individualized causes of 
action “would effectively nullify local authority by mandating 
approval of all (or nearly all) applications.”95 If AT&T’s challenge 
of a single denial is likely to fail in the Fourth Circuit, then 
surely the challenge will be all the more likely to fail if Verizon 
already has a working tower in the area. 
2. The Own-Coverage Rule 
Three other circuits, as well as the FCC, have rejected the 
one-provider rule. 96 In Second Generation Properties L.P. v. Town 
                                                                                                     
 92. See Willoth, 176 F.3d at 641–43 (analyzing the statutory definitions); 
see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(7)(C)(i), 332(d) (2012) (defining “personal wireless 
services”). 
 93. Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643 (emphasis added). 
 94. Instead, the Fourth Circuit takes the position that single denials rarely, 
if ever, constitute violations of subsection (B)(i)(II). See supra Part III.A.1. 
 95. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 
428 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 96. See Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d (1st 
Cir. 2002) (“The fact that some carrier provides some service to some consumers 
does not in itself mean that the town has not effectively prohibited services to 
other consumers.”); see also T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 
807 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Second Generation); MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 732 
(citing Second Generation); Petition for Declaratory Ruling to Clarify Provisions 
of Section 332(c)(7)(B), 24 FCC Rcd. 13994, 14016–17 (2009) [hereinafter FCC 
Ruling] (“[W]e conclude that under the better reading of the statute, this 
limitation of State/local authority applies not just to the first carrier to enter 
into the market, but also to all subsequent entrants.”). 
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of Pelham,97 the First Circuit rejected the one-provider rule on 
both statutory–textual and practical–policy grounds. As for the 
statutory grounds, subsection (B)(i)(II) speaks of “prohibiting the 
provision of personal wireless services,” the plural being crucial to 
the court.98 As for the pragmatic implications, the First Circuit 
worried that a one-provider rule would carve out separate 
enclaves for different cell phone providers based on wherever 
their towers were. Town A may have great reception for Verizon 
customers but little to offer to AT&T customers. Just a few miles 
down the highway in Town B, the situation could be reversed, 
with AT&T providing better service than Verizon.99 In Second 
Generation, the First Circuit stated that “[t]he result would be a 
crazy patchwork quilt of intermittent coverage [that] might have 
the effect of driving the industry toward a single carrier.”100 This 
would be quite the opposite of the legislation’s stated goal to 
“open[] all telecommunications markets to competition.”101 
Because of the potential for the “crazy patchwork quilt,” the court 
worried that “[t]he fact that some carrier provides some service to 
some consumers does not in itself mean that the town has not 
effectively prohibited services to other consumers.”102 Even if the 
market does not tend toward monopoly, the patchwork is still 
problematic. “From the perspective of a customer who has poor 
coverage with T-Mobile in a certain area, it is little consolation 
that another provider, Verizon for example, may have good 
service in the same area.”103 The Sixth104 and Ninth Circuits105 
have also accepted the First Circuit’s reasoning on this issue. 
                                                                                                     
 97. 313 F.3d 620 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 98. See id. at 633 (“A straightforward reading is that ‘services’ refers to 
more than one carrier. Congress contemplated that there be multiple carriers 
competing to provide services to consumers.”). 
 99. All of this is to say nothing about the out-of-town traveler driving 
through with a third carrier like T-Mobile. 
 100. Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 633. 
 101. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 1 (1995). 
 102. Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 634. 
 103. T-Mobile Cent., LLC v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 807 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 104. See id. (“In light of the FCC’s endorsement of the standards used by the 
First and Ninth Circuits, we now adopt this approach.”). 
 105. See MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 733 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“[W]e elect to . . . formally adopt the First Circuit’s rule that a significant 
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The FCC was also swayed by this logic. In a 2009 declaratory 
ruling, the Commission largely adopted both the plural “services” 
argument106 and the patchwork quilt worries.107 Additionally, the 
FCC recognized “the possibility that the first carrier may not 
provide service to the entire locality.”108 In such a scenario, “a 
zoning approach that subsequently prohibits or effectively 
prohibits additional carriers therefore may leave segments of the 
population unserved or underserved.”109 Finally, in that same 
ruling, the FCC also criticized the Fourth Circuit’s blanket-ban-
only approach.110 Thus, the FCC has come down in favor of the 
own-coverage rule as well. 
C. Third Split: How to Identify Feasible Alternatives? 
The two-pronged test’s logic is that if the zoning authority 
denies a petition for even the best possible tower location in a 
“dead zone,” then that is effectively a ban on all cell phone 
towers. Aside from the issue of whether a significant gap is with 
respect to one or any carrier, the circuits also vary on how to 
determine the quality of other alternative locations. Specifically, 
                                                                                                     
gap in service (and thus an effective prohibition of service) exists whenever a 
provider is prevented from filling a significant gap in its own service coverage.”). 
 106. See FCC Ruling, supra note 96, at 14017 (“First, our interpretation is 
consistent with the statutory language referring to the prohibition of ‘the 
provision of personal wireless services’ rather than the singular term ‘service.’”). 
 107. See id. at 14017–18 (“Our interpretation in this Declaratory Ruling 
promotes these statutory objectives more effectively than the alternative, which 
could perpetuate significant coverage gaps within any individual wireless 
provider’s service area.”). 
 108. Id. at 14017. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 14017 (“[W]e find unavailing the reasons cited by the Fourth 
Circuit (and some other courts) to support the interpretation that the statute 
only limits localities from prohibiting all personal wireless services (i.e., a 
blanket ban or ‘one-provider’ approach).”). Here, the FCC interestingly—and 
somewhat confusingly—conflated both the one-provider rule and the blanket-
ban rule. While these two are somewhat related, see supra notes 82–83 and 
accompanying text, they are separate positions. A one-provider-rule jurisdiction 
would not entertain an effective-prohibition challenge from a locality’s second 
cellular provider whereas the Fourth Circuit would not entertain such a suit for 
the second or even the first cellular provider because they interpret § 332(c)(7) 
in a way that never applies to an individual denial in nearly any case. See supra 
Part III.A.1. 
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they are split as to whether to apply a no-alternative rule or the 
least-intrusive rule. 
1. The No-Alternative Rule 
In the First and Seventh Circuits, a denied service provider 
must demonstrate that its rejected site was the “only feasible 
plan”111 and that “there are no alternative sites which would 
solve”112 the coverage gap. The underlying reasoning of this rule 
apparently is that the zoning board could not have instituted an 
effective prohibition because there are other feasible sites that 
the board would approve.113 If, however, the only viable location 
still did not satisfy the board’s standards, then it has instituted a 
policy with the effect of prohibiting towers generally. If the only 
option is not good enough for the board, then there are no real 
options. 
2. The Least-Intrusive Rule 
In the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, the courts 
use a slightly different metric to compare the rejected site with 
other potential sites in the area. Instead of considering the simple 
question of whether other viable sites exist, these courts 
determine whether the denied location is “the least intrusive on 
                                                                                                     
 111. Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 630 
(1st Cir. 2002) (stating that an effective prohibition would exist “where the 
plaintiff’s existing application is the only feasible plan; in that case, denial of the 
plaintiff’s application might amount to prohibiting personal wireless service” 
(citations and quotations omitted)); see also VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. 
Croix Cnty., 342 F.3d 818, 834–35 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Second Generation). 
 112. See Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 (“An applicant for a zoning 
permit arguing that there is an effective prohibition must still show that there 
are no alternative sites which would solve the problem.”); see also VoiceStream, 
342 F.3d at 834–35 (citing Second Generation). 
 113. Readers are ultimately left only to guess at the rationale because the 
First and Seventh Circuits did not elaborate much about why they chose the no-
alternative rule. Rather, the two key decisions provide only a few sentences 
regarding this issue and do not mention the fact that other circuits have used 
another rule. See Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635; VoiceStream, 342 F.3d at 
834–35.  
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the values that the denial sought to serve.”114 This leads to a 
somewhat lighter burden for rejected cellular providers115—or at 
least a much more cabined analysis. Instead of the court 
considering the broad, general question of whether any other 
feasible options exist, the considerations are limited to the 
grounds on which the denial purported to rest.116 For example, if 
the zoning board’s denial decision stated that the proposed site 
would ruin the view of a scenic mountain range, the zoning board 
could not later argue that the proposed site did not provide 
cellular reception to the other side of the county. The board 
denied the application on aesthetic grounds, not on coverage 
grounds. Instead, the court’s analysis would be focused on 
whether there are any other sites in the county that would be less 
disruptive of the scenic view; other concerns not raised by the 
board in the initial denial would not be considered. The least-
intrusive rule has the effect of holding a zoning board to its initial 
reasoning, not allowing it to change arguments later. 
D. The Effect of the FCC Ruling on the Circuit Splits 
The FCC has taken a position on two of the three circuit 
splits. It has interpreted subsection (B)(i)(II) to apply to even 
single denials of zoning permits, thus siding against the Fourth 
Circuit on the first split.117 The FCC has also found the own-
                                                                                                     
 114. APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 480 (3d Cir. 
1999); see also T-Moble Cent., LLC v. W. Bloomfield, 691 F.3d 794, 808 (6th Cir. 
2012) (“We agree with . . . and adopt the ‘least intrusive’ standard from the 
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits.”); MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 
F.3d 715, 735 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e now adopt the ‘least intrusive means’ 
standard . . . .”); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“A local government may reject an application for construction of a 
wireless service facility in an under-served area without [violating subsection 
(B)(i)(II)] if the service gap can be closed by less intrusive means.”). 
 115. See, e.g., MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 734–35 (accepting the least-intrusive 
standard over the no-alternative rule and stating that the First and Seventh 
Circuits’ interpretations were “too exacting”). 
 116. See, e.g., APT Pittsburgh, 196 F.3d at 480 (“[T]he provider applicant 
must also show that the manner in which it proposes to fill the significant gap 
in service is the least intrusive on the values that the denial sought to serve.”). 
 117. See FCC Ruling, supra note 96, at 14017 (“[W]e find unavailing the 
reasons cited by the Fourth Circuit (and some other courts) to support the 
interpretation that the statute only limits localities from prohibiting all 
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coverage rule to be better than the one-provider rule.118 Until 
now, this Note has considered the FCC positions alongside the 
circuits’ decisions as if they were of equal weight. However, 
because of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Arlington v. 
FCC,119 it is possible that the FCC Ruling regarding these first 
two issues has effectively overruled the circuits’ varying 
positions. 
City of Arlington was an appeal from a Fifth Circuit ruling120 
that accepted the FCC’s interpretation of (B)(ii)’s “reasonable 
period of time” requirement.121 The FCC Ruling at issue in this 
case is the very same Ruling that took a position on the first two 
circuit splits. The Court determined that (B)(ii) was ambiguous 
and the FCC’s interpretation of it was reasonable, thus entitling 
the Ruling to Chevron122 deference.123 However, it was not 
                                                                                                     
personal wireless services (i.e., a blanket ban or ‘one-provider’ approach).”). See 
also supra note 110 and accompanying text (describing the FCC’s criticism and 
rejection of the one-provider rule). 
 118. See FCC Ruling, supra note 96, at 14016  
We conclude that a State or local government that denies an 
application for personal wireless service facilities siting solely 
because one or more carriers serve a given geographic market has 
engaged in unlawful regulation that prohibits or has the effect of 
prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services within the 
meaning of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
 119. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 120. City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d 133 S. Ct. 
1863 (2013). 
 121. Subsection (B)(ii) requires that zoning authorities respond applications 
regarding cell towers to be addressed in a “reasonable period of time.” The FCC 
Ruling had interpreted this to mean “presumptively, 90 days to process personal 
wireless facility siting applications requesting collocations, and, also 
presumptively, 150 days to process all other applications.” FCC Ruling, supra 
note 96, at 14005. 
 122. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984) (“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue . . . the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”); see 
also id. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is 
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative 
interpretations.”). 
 123. See City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 247−54 (concluding that the FCC 
Ruling, supra note 96, is entitled to Chevron deference, at least with respect to 
the FCC’s interpretation of subsection (B)(ii) and “reasonable period of time”). 
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entirely clear whether the FCC actually had the authority under 
this statute to interpret the statute in the first place.124 Of course 
the FCC thought that it had interpretive authority.125 
Controversially, the Fifth Circuit gave the FCC Chevron 
deference on this initial jurisdictional question, as well.126 Thus, 
the Fifth Circuit ruled that the FCC’s determination of its own 
interpretative authority was entitled to Chevron deference. This, 
in turn, meant that the FCC’s interpretation of (B)(iii) could get 
Chevron deference, as well.  
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered the issue of 
whether agencies are entitled to Chevron deference on 
interpretations of their own jurisdiction, and the Court ruled that 
they in fact are.127 While City of Arlington will no doubt have a 
great impact on administrative law generally, it also establishes 
that the FCC Ruling at issue there—which is also the very same 
Ruling in which the FCC considered the first two circuit splits—is 
in fact entitled to Chevron deference despite the FCC’s 
questionable interpretive authority. For the courts that disagree 
with the FCC,128 City of Arlington puts them in the awkward 
position of either applying their own circuit precedents or 
applying Chevron. While this is an interesting question of 
administrative law, it is beyond the scope of this Note. Part IV 
attempts to demonstrate how the circuit splits should be solved 
                                                                                                     
 124. See, e.g., id. at 247–48 (considering the issue of whether the FCC has 
authority to interpret § 332(c)(7) and ruling that, because the Fifth Circuit gives 
agencies Chevron deference for determinations of their own authority, the FCC 
does have authority to do so). 
 125. FCC Ruling, supra note 96, at 14000–03 (“We agree . . . that the 
Commission has the authority to interpret Section 332(c)(7).”). 
 126. See City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 248 (“Some circuits apply Chevron 
deference to disputes over the scope of an agency’s jurisdiction, some do not, and 
some circuits have thus far avoided taking a position. In this circuit, we apply 
Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction . . . .” 
(citations omitted)).  Up until now, this jurisdictional question had sometimes 
been thought of as a “pre-Chevron” question. Id. 
 127. See City of Arlington, 113 S. Ct. at 1870–71 (describing the line 
between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional agency interpretations as illusory, 
and reaffirming that “the question in every case is, simply, whether the 
statutory text forecloses the agency’s assertion of authority, or not”). 
 128. For the first split, the Fourth Circuit, which takes the “blanket ban” 
approach. For the second split, the Second and Third Circuits, which take the 
“one-provider” approach. See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.B.1, respectively. 
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based on statutory interpretation, not how the splits might be 
solved by agency law. 
Table: Summary of Circuit Splits 
 
First Circuit Split:  
Can a single denial qualify as an effective prohibition? 
 
No; blanket-ban-only rule: 4th 
Circuit 
Yes; apply two-pronged analysis: 
1st, 2d, 3d, 6th, 7th, and 9th 
Circuits; FCC; 5th indirectly via 
Chevron deference  
 
Second Circuit Split:  
Can there be a significant gap if another cell provider is already 
servicing the area? 
 
No; one-provider rule: 2d and 3d 
Circuits; 4th Circuit implicitly 
Yes; own-coverage rule: 1st, 6th, 
and 9th Circuits; FCC; 5th Circuit 
indirectly via Chevron deference  
 
Third Circuit Split:  
What is the standard for considering alternative sites? 
 
No-alternative rule: 1st and 7th 
Circuits 
Least-intrusive rule: 2d, 3d, 6th, 
and 9th Circuits 
IV. Analysis, Critique, and Recommendations 
Now that the three circuit splits have been laid out and the 
six potential answers have all been described, this Part moves on 
to consider and analyze each of the splits in turn. This Part will 
pay particular attention to the text of the Act itself as well as the 
underlying policy motivations. Also, the analysis will use various 
rational actor assumptions to attempt to predict the practical 
outcomes should each of the various rules be adopted nationwide. 
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A. First Split: Fourth Circuit vs. the Rest 
The first circuit split is the threshold issue for the other two; 
if one shares the Fourth Circuit’s view that a single denial can 
never violate subsection (B)(i)(II) and that only blanket bans are 
prohibited, then the next two circuit splits drop out of the 
question entirely. If a single denial can never violate subsection 
(B)(i)(II), then there is no need to even consider the two-pronged 
analysis around which the other two splits revolve. Thus, it 
makes sense to start untangling the splits by first considering the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City 
Council of Virginia Beach.129 
The court’s approach is laudable in that it was guided by a 
desire to preserve local zoning authority to the fullest extent 
possible;130 indeed, this is in the text of the statute itself.131 The 
Act, however, does put limitations on local zoning authority. 
That, too, is in the text of the Act.132 Subsection (B)(i)(II) is 
undeniably one of those limitations.133 Local zoning authority is 
preserved except to the extent that it “prohibit[s] or ha[s] the 
effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.”134 
This is where the Fourth Circuit errs, however. The court’s 
blanket-ban-only rule and its refusal to apply subsection (B)(i)(II) 
to individual denials effectively interprets away the phrase “or 
have the effect of prohibiting.”  This goes against the well-settled 
canon of statutory construction that statutes are to be interpreted 
                                                                                                     
 129. 155 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 130. See id. at 428–29 (“[O]ur reading simultaneously furthers the Act’s 
explicit goals of . . . preserving a large portion of local authority by maintaining 
that authority in particular cases.”); id. at 429 (“[B]ut this is necessary to avoid 
destroying local authority.”). 
 131. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012) (“Except as provided in this paragraph, 
nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local 
government or instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, 
construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”). 
 132. § 332(c)(7)(B) (providing, under the title “Limitations,” that “[t]he 
regulation of the placement . . . of personal wireless service facilities by any 
State or local government . . . (I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among 
providers of functionally equivalent services; and (II) shall not prohibit or have 
the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II). 
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so as to make every word carry some meaning and to avoid 
rendering words superfluous.135  
The Fourth Circuit was not unmindful of this critique and 
defended against it in the AT&T decision. The court argued that 
even if individual denials were not affected by subsection 
(B)(i)(II), the provision could still be used to prohibit moratoria on 
cell phone towers.136 The court went on to cite several examples of 
subsection (B)(i)(II) being used for just such a purpose, striking 
down blanket bans on any new towers in a given locality.137 This 
argument entirely misses the point, however. The cell tower 
moratoria to which the Fourth Circuit pointed would not need to 
be struck down under the second, “or have the effect of” part of 
subsection (B)(i)(II). Moratoria are not effective prohibitions, but 
simply straight-up prohibitions. Such blatant violations of the Act 
are already prohibited under the first portion of subsection 
(B)(i)(II)—“shall not prohibit”—and the second clause would still 
be unnecessary. The Fourth Circuit’s defense to this criticism is 
completely inapposite, and in fact further demonstrates the 
validity of the critique: the blanket-ban rule renders a crucial 
part of the statute meaningless. 
The flaws in the court’s reasoning do not end there, however. 
The court also relied on false presumptions. The court stated that 
“any reading of subsection (B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection to 
apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local 
authority by mandating approval of all (or nearly all) 
                                                                                                     
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is 
our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . .” 
(citing Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))); Astoria Fed. Sav. 
& Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991) (“But of course we construe 
statutes, where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts 
thereof.”). 
 136. AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council of Va. Beach, 155 F.3d 423, 
428 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he numerous cases involving local zoning authorities’ 
moratoria on new zoning permits demonstrate that the reading of the statute we 
adopt today would hardly render the section of no use.”). 
 137. Id. (citing Lucas v. Planning Bd. of LaGrange, 7 F. Supp. 2d 310 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Jefferson Cnty., 968 F. Supp. 1457 
(N.D. Ala. 1997); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of W. Seneca, 659 N.Y.S.2d 687 
(Sup. Ct. 1997); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Town of Farmington, No. 3:97 CV 
863(GLG), 1997 WL 631104 (D. Conn. Oct. 6, 1997); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. 
City of Medina, 924 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Wash. 1996)). 
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applications.”138 That is simply not true. Courts can review 
individual zoning decisions without requiring approval by the 
boards in every circumstance. Indeed, nearly every other circuit 
in the nation has found a way to do just that. This is, 
incidentally, the very purpose and effect of § 332(c)(7): to allow 
aggrieved service providers to challenge adverse zoning decisions 
in a federal court.139 In fact, why would the Act provide for such a 
remedy to individual cellular service providers if it did not apply 
to individual zoning decisions? For fear of adopting a rule that 
would always require the cell phone companies to win at the 
zoning board, the Fourth Circuit went on to adopt a rule in which 
the cell phone companies would always lose in district court 
challenges. There is certainly room for a middle path on this 
issue, but the Fourth Circuit unfortunately was not able to find it 
while every other circuit court has.  
The court was undeniably correct in stating that the Act 
“manifestly contemplates the ability of local authorities to ‘deny a 
request.’”140 But, just because something can be permissible does 
not mean that it always must be permissible. Again, this nuance 
was also lost on the court.141 Moreover, it is not immediately 
apparent just how many times a cell phone provider has to be 
denied by a zoning board before subsection (B)(i)(II) is violated. If 
a single denial will never suffice, would five denials be enough? 
Maybe ten? In addition to faulty statutory interpretation, the 
Fourth Circuit’s position is also inferior from a judicial economy 
perspective. By never allowing a single denial to trigger 
                                                                                                     
 138. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428. 
 139. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (“Any person adversely affected by any final action 
or failure to act by a State or local government . . . may, within 30 days after 
such action or failure to act, commence an action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.”). 
 140. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428; see also § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (“Any decision by a 
State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, 
construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and 
supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.”). 
 141. AT&T, 155 F.3d at 428 
[A]ny reading of subsection (B)(i)(II) that allows the subsection to 
apply to individual decisions would effectively nullify local authority 
by mandating approval of all (or nearly all) applications, a result 
contrary to the explicit language of section (B)(iii), which manifestly 
contemplates the ability of local authorities to “deny a request.” 
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subsection (B)(i)(II), the Fourth Circuit’s rule encourages 
frequent and successive petitions both to the zoning board—
testing new sites—and to the court—testing whether there is yet 
enough evidence to convince the court of an effective ban.  
The alternative to the Fourth Circuit’s position—the two-
pronged approach generally adopted by every other circuit that 
has considered the issue142—is based on simple logic. It only 
stands to reason that if there is a gap in cellular reception and 
even the most ideal site for a cell phone tower is rejected (say, in 
a secluded area, able to be disguised into the landscape, yet still 
solving a significant dead zone), then any other and lesser sites 
would also be rejected. If even the best is not good enough, then 
nothing is good enough. If nothing is good enough, then the 
zoning board’s impossibly high standards are effectively a ban on 
cell phone towers. A denial of a single application, if based on 
such a stringent policy, can evince an effective prohibition.  
One could argue that the two-pronged approach—and the 
two circuit splits that have formed around it—is somewhat more 
complicated than the six simple words, “or have the effect of 
prohibiting.” Indeed, the interpretation does seem to read a lot 
into that short phrase, perhaps stretching it into something more 
unwieldy. To some extent, however, we should expect 
interpretations to do this—to explain, explicate, and unpack a 
statute. Rarely does an interpretation result in a shorter rule or 
fewer words, but rather an elaboration with a finer, more 
particularized meaning. That is precisely what interpretation is, 
and this is what the two-pronged approach entails. Moreover, it is 
derived from the plain meaning of the statutory language and, 
unlike the Fourth Circuit’s rule, it does not render parts of the 
Act meaningless. For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit’s overly 
constrained rule ought to be rejected in favor of the general two-
pronged approach. This does not end the inquiry, however, as 
there are two more circuit splits to consider. 
                                                                                                     
 142. See supra Part III.A.2. 
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B. The Second Split: One-Provider Rule vs. Own-Coverage Rule 
To analyze this second split between the one-provider and 
own-coverage rules, recall the hypothetical scenario provided in 
Part III.B.: AT&T is looking to build a new tower in a town that 
is not yet served by AT&T, but is served by an already-existing 
Verizon tower. If AT&T’s zoning application was rejected by the 
local board, the one-provider rule would preclude the company’s 
subsection (B)(v) effective-prohibition suit because the area is 
already served by Verizon. If the board is nonetheless willing to 
allow this second tower, then it of course is free to allow AT&T to 
build it. One-provider jurisdictions just will not require the board 
to approve AT&T’s application. In this sense, the one-provider 
rule leaves more room for local authority over tower siting, and 
thus could be seen as more in line with the text of § 332(c)(7): 
“Except as otherwise provided . . . , nothing in this chapter shall 
limit or affect the authority of a State or local government . . . 
over decisions regarding the placement, construction, and 
modification of personal wireless service facilities.”143 However, 
the operative phrase there is “[e]xcept as otherwise provided,” 
and we are indeed considering and analyzing one of the 
exceptions explicitly laid out in the statute; namely, subsection 
(B)(i)(II). Just as preservation of local authority is one of the 
underlying policies of the Act,144 so is fostering a national 
telecommunications infrastructure.145 Section 332(c)(7) takes 
local authority and tempers it with limitations designed to serve 
national interests, and one of these limits is the issue at hand. 
Thus, the increased deference to local zoning authority is a strong 
argument in favor of the one-provider rule, but this does not 
necessarily trump. The analysis must also include other factors. 
In adopting the one-provider rule, the Second and Third 
Circuits stressed the fact that the “focus [of § 332(c)(7)] is on the 
                                                                                                     
 143. § 332(c)(7)(A). 
 144. See id. (“Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this chapter 
shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or 
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, 
and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”); see also § 332(c)(7) 
(section entitled “Preservation of local zoning authority”). 
 145. See supra Part II.B. for a discussion of the local–national balance 
struck by § 332(c)(7). 
2014 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1981 (2013) 
remote users’ access to the national telephone network.”146 As 
long as residents of the locality can receive telecommunications 
from even just one provider, subsection (B)(i)(II)’s goal is 
fulfilled.147 Thus, the one-provider rule purports to be more 
consumer-centric view, at least in terms of initial perspective. 
However, the rule may not be consumer-friendly in terms of its 
effects on the market. The rule implicitly—if not explicitly—
allows for a monopoly. As long as one provider already serves the 
market (Verizon in the above hypothetical), the next cell phone 
company is not guaranteed the opportunity to also serve the area 
(AT&T). While zoning boards in one-provider jurisdictions can 
presumably allow in second entrants if they want, there is no 
reason to think that localities would be eager to do so, especially 
given the strong not-in-my-back-yard pressures.148 Thus, if one 
assumes that zoning authorities will usually deny towers that 
they are not required to accept, initial providers like Verizon will 
be able to maintain a monopoly. This one-participant market 
would be upheld, ironically, pursuant to the antimonopolistic 
TCA, an act with the express purpose of “opening all 
telecommunications markets to competition.”149 Therefore, the 
one-provider rule would lead to practical outcomes that are the 
exact opposite of the clearly stated legislative intent of the Act.  
These monopoly problems would only be exacerbated by the 
“crazy patchwork quilt” that the First Circuit was rightly 
concerned with in Second Generation Properties, L.P. v. Town of 
Pelham.150 There, the court worried that various one-provider 
pockets “might have the effect of driving the industry toward a 
                                                                                                     
 146. APT Pittsburgh, Ltd. P’ship v. Penn. Twp., 196 F.3d 469, 479 (3d Cir. 
1999); see also Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Willoth, 176 F.3d 630, 643 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(using the remote users’ perspective in adopting the one-provider rule (cited in 
APT Pittsburgh)).  
 147. See, e.g., MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 731–32 
(9th Cir. 2005) (describing the Second and Third Circuits’ position: “as long as 
some provider offers service in the area, consumers will be adequately 
served . . . . Under this view, the [Act] protects only the individual user’s ability 
to receive service from one provider or another . . . ”). 
 148. See supra Part II.A. 
 149. H. REP. No. 104-458 at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 124. 
 150. 313 F.3d 620, 633 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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single carrier.”151 Whether this would actually lead to a single-
participant market nationally is unclear, but that is certainly a 
possibility. What is clear, however, is that the one-provider rule 
would allow for many single-participant markets locally, perhaps 
changing from town to town. This is because the provider in a 
given locality would be determined by which cell phone company 
won the race to get the first—and only—zoning board approval. 
While residents of each town will most likely know which cell 
phone company is the only one with coverage in the area, this 
does not really address why people want cell phones. “If your car 
breaks down somewhere where there is a gap in your wireless 
service, it won’t matter that there is another service provider in 
that area. That person will be unable to call for help . . . .”152 
Allowing such balkanized enclaves of cell reception for just one 
provider each totally undercuts the very purpose for a nationwide 
cellular infrastructure in the first place. People want cell phones 
to give them the ability to make a call from anywhere, not just 
their hometown. Thus, the one-provider rule would establish not 
just monopoly markets, but an entire series of monopoly markets, 
each dominated by a different provider. The own-coverage rule, 
however, would counteract these monopolistic tendencies by 
allowing any competitor to get a foothold in any new market, 
assuming, of course, that the new entrant can find a tower site 
that meets the other qualifications. In this respect, the own-
coverage rule is preferable and more in-line with the legislative 
intent of the Act. 
The fundamental trade-off here is the desire for a competitive 
market with multiple service providers (carrier-friendly own-
coverage rule) versus having as few towers in a locality as 
possible, perhaps even just one tower (zoning-board-friendly one-
provider rule). Before one can conclude that one of these is better 
than the other, it is worth attempting to devise solutions that 
                                                                                                     
 151. Id. at 633. 
 152. Chani Katzen, High Court Declines Phone-Tower Case Newtown 
Township Wants the Structure Removed Now. Omnipoint Was Challenging an 
Appeals Court Ruling., PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 2000, 
http://articles.philly.com/2000-11-07/news/25613548_1_phone-tower-phone-
tower-cellular-telecommunications-industry-association (quoting an attorney for 
Omnipoint Communications after a failed writ of certiorari petition in 
Omnipoint Commc’s Enters. v. Newtown Twp., 219 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied 531 U.S. 985 (2000)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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sidestep this dilemma. Essentially, we should try to have the 
cake and eat it too. One possibility for this is co-location, which is 
putting multiple carriers’ signal-receiving equipment on the same 
tower,153 to the extent that this is technologically feasible.154 
Typically, the tower owner will allow other cellular providers to 
place their equipment there on the same tower in exchange for 
rental payments or some sort of licensing agreement.155  
At first glance, this seems to offer the perfect solution to the 
intractable monopoly problems with the one-provider rule. Such a 
jurisdiction could still have multiple carriers offering cellular 
service if they all simply co-located on the same tower. While this 
seems to neutralize the monopoly issue, it actually just shifts it 
behind the scenes. Instead of a monopoly on the provision of 
cellular service to consumers, there is now a monopoly on the 
provision of tower facilities to other competing carriers. With the 
one-provider rule allowing localities to prohibit second towers, the 
new entrant to the market has absolutely no bargaining power 
when negotiating for the rights to co-locate on the one existing 
tower.156 Relatedly, there is little if any, downward pressure on 
                                                                                                     
 153.  See Long, supra note 20, at 386 (defining co-location as the “placement 
of more than one company’s antennas on a single tower”); see also Omnipoint 
Commc’s, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(considering a case in which a local zoning board denied an application to co-
locate another carrier’s receiving equipment on a preexisting tower and ruling 
that the denial was in violation of § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) because it unreasonably 
discriminated against equivalent services); Timothy L. Gustin, The Perpetual 
Growth and Controversy of the Cellular Superhighway: Cellular Tower Siting 
and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1029 
(1997) (advocating for a co-location amendment to the TCA to “require 
competing cellular providers to share the same cellular tower when 
technologically feasible”). 
 154. Depending on the circumstances, certain frequencies between carriers 
could cause interference with each other. See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 153, at 
1029 n.173 (“Collocation [sic] would not be feasible when it creates frequency 
interference, known as intermodulation.” (citations omitted)); Long, supra note 
20, at 386–87 (“Co-location is limited by one technical constraint, however: 
Antennas placed too close together cause interference. Thus, only a limited 
number of antennas can coexist on one tower without reducing service quality.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 153, at 1029 n.176 and accompanying text 
(describing the differences between a lease, sublease, and license in such co-
location agreements). 
 156. At this point, one might suggest the possibility of the zoning board 
requiring consent to co-location as a prerequisite to approval. However, a few 
problems arise regarding the price. If none is set and the consent must be to free 
UNTANGLING THE CIRCUIT SPLITS 2017 
the incumbent tower-owner’s asking price. If the second 
(attempted) market entrant is not willing to pay the exorbitantly 
high rental, maybe the third or fourth entrants will.157 These new 
carriers will surely pass the increased costs on to their new 
customers in the locality, thereby providing even more market 
advantages to the initial carrier. Or, if no other cell phone 
company is willing to pay the high rent, it may not be any loss to 
the incumbent carrier as they can make up any lost rental 
revenue through higher rates on their captive customers. The 
initial carrier would have a monopoly, after all; where else would 
the customers go? Thus, we see that, even with co-location as a 
possibility, the one-provider rule will still tend towards 
monopolies against the obvious intent of the statute. 
On the other hand, the own-coverage rule would actually 
encourage co-location. A second entrant to the market would have 
the choice between building their own new tower or co-locating 
and paying rent to the incumbent carrier. This choice provided to 
                                                                                                     
co-location, then the initial builder of the tower would necessarily bear all up-
front costs associated with building the tower (which surely would get passed 
along to their paying customers), while the new, co-locating entrants would get 
to ride free. If a price is set in the board-imposed co-location consent, then there 
is still no guarantee that it is an efficient price. If the price is too low, there still 
will be a first-mover/free-rider problem, and if it is too high, then the initial 
carrier will still dominate the provision of cell phone service in that locality. The 
co-location price would most likely be better set by a market in which a second 
entrant has the choice of co-locating or building a new tower; this could be done 
by adoption of the own-coverage rule (see infra pp. 2017–18 for further 
explanation). 
 157. One might suggest that cell phone companies do have an incentive to 
offer fair, reasonable prices to one another, even if the later entrants are forced 
to co-locate rather than build a new tower. In a market with a few large 
participants, there indeed could be some downward pressure on rentals. For 
example, if AT&T charges a high price for Verizon’s co-location in Town A, 
Verizon would easily turn around and overcharge AT&T for its proposed co-
location in Town B. Thus, with a few repeat players who are each dominant in 
their own localities determined essentially at random (i.e., whoever built the 
first tower), there could be an incentive to “play nice.” One could even foresee 
national agreements between large carriers like Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and 
the like to set reasonable rental prices for co-location. However, encouraging 
such agreements could easily have oligopolistic tendencies, allowing the larger 
firms to squeeze out smaller competitors who do not have many (or any) 
preexisting towers on which to offer low co-location rentals. Instead of relying on 
such post hoc fixes to the problems inherent with the one-provider rule, it is 
better to adopt the own-coverage rule that directly encourages a fair, market-
based co-location price-setting at the outset (see below for further explanation). 
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the second entrant would serve as an upper limit to what the first 
tower-owner could charge in a lease or license. If the asking price 
is more than the costs associated with zoning and building a 
second tower, no rational actor would sign on to such an 
agreement. Therefore, the first carriers would be incentivized to 
not monopolistically overcharge their competitors, but to offer a 
price that second entrants might actually take. In this sense, the 
own-coverage rule should lead to more co-location and fewer 
towers total by setting a fair, market-based price while 
simultaneously avoiding the monopoly problems of the one-
provider rule. Thus, the own-coverage rule is preferable, not 
because it is better to side with the cell phone companies over 
local zoning boards, but rather because the rule incentivizes co-
location. This leads to the most optimal outcome for both sides—
better reception for more carriers with fewer towers. 
C. Third Split: No-Alternative Rule vs. Least-Intrusive Rule 
The third and final circuit split concerns the metric by which 
other potential sites are judged. The first of the two possible rules 
asks the court to answer the incredibly broad question of whether 
the rejected site was the “only feasible plan”158 or if “there [were 
other] alternative sites which would solve”159 the coverage gap.160 
While this phrasing of the rule keeps with the general approach 
of the two-pronged analysis, the main problem with this 
interpretation is that it is too general. The court is posed with the 
broad and subjective question of what other options are available 
and whether they are more feasible, with no guidance as to what 
actually constitutes feasibility. Such an open-ended question not 
                                                                                                     
 158. Second Generation Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 313 F.3d 620, 630 
(1st Cir. 2002) (stating that an effective prohibition would exist “where the 
plaintiff’s existing application is the only feasible plan; in that case, denial of the 
plaintiff’s application might amount to prohibiting personal wireless service” 
(citations and quotations omitted)); see also VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. 
Croix Cnty., 342 F.3d 818, 834–35 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Second Generation). 
 159. Second Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 (“An applicant for a zoning permit 
arguing that there is an effective prohibition must still show that there are no 
alternative sites which would solve the problem.”); see also VoiceStream, 342 
F.3d at 834–35 (citing Second Generation). 
 160. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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only leaves the court with nowhere to begin the analysis, but also 
leaves it with nowhere to end. With this rule, the court could 
consider any—rather, would have to consider every—possible 
factor in tower siting. This leaves the inquiry overly broad and 
needlessly complicates the litigation. Moreover, the no-
alternative rule, by its own terms, seeks to find the one best 
potential tower site out of the vast array of possible ones in the 
locality.161 Searching for some hypothetical best site—in the 
formal, cumbersome, and expensive litigation context, no less—is 
surely a fool’s errand.  
Making similar observations, the Ninth Circuit has critiqued 
the no-alternative rule because it is “too exacting.”162 The court 
noted that when there are several other viable sites (assuming, of 
course, that the court could come up with a workable definition of 
viability), the no-alternative rule “would either preclude the 
construction of any facility (since no single site is the ‘only viable’ 
alternative) or require providers to endure repeated denials by 
local authorities until only one feasible alternative remained.”163 
Thus, this rule could run into the same pragmatic and judicial 
economy concerns raised regarding the Fourth Circuit’s blanket-
ban rule.164  
The least-intrusive rule, however, avoids many of these 
problems. First, it narrows the range of possible factors to be 
considered by the court.165 Instead of being able to consider 
anything and everything relating to the feasibility of the site, the 
court would only need to consider those factors mentioned in the 
denial itself.166 This gives a reviewing court a clear place to begin 
                                                                                                     
 161. The rule’s own terms lead to this because if a rejected site has no 
alternatives, then it is, by definition, the best possible site. See Second 
Generation, 313 F.3d at 635 (“An applicant for a zoning permit arguing that 
there is an effective prohibition must still show that there are no alternative 
sites which would solve the problem.” (emphasis added)); see also VoiceStream, 
342 F.3d at 834–35 (citing Second Generation). 
 162. MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 734 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See supra Part IV.A. 
 165. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing how the least-
intrusive rule narrows the court’s inquiry). 
 166. See, e.g., MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 435 (“The Second and Third Circuits 
require the provider to show that ‘the manner in which it proposes to fill the 
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and end the analysis: read the denial letter, consider the factors 
used, and, using the reasoning of the zoning board, determine if 
the rejected site was still the least intrusive on those grounds. 
Presumably, the least-intrusive rule would still require the court 
to consider other potential sites to see if the rejected one is really 
the least intrusive, but at least those factors used would be 
limited to only those factors mentioned in the denial. 
The least-intrusive rule takes the zoning decision seriously 
and binds the board to the rationale it purported to use in the 
initial denial. This holds the board accountable for what it said 
below and makes sure that the reasoning is logical and 
consistent. Such accountability is desirable in this situation 
because localities might otherwise be tempted to reject cell towers 
for purely not-in-my-back-yard reasoning167 and then come up 
with other pretextual excuses in the formal written denials. If on 
review the court determines that the rejected site was actually 
the least intrusive on the purported values used by the board, 
then the site would be approved. Under a no-alternative test, in 
which the court can consider any factors relating to feasibility, a 
locality’s pretextual denial may otherwise be upheld on other 
grounds that they did not consider and rely on in their decision.  
On a similar note, the least-intrusive rule would prevent the 
locality from changing its argument against approval of the site 
midway through the application–litigation process. Operating in 
a way similar to estoppel,168 the board could not argue one 
rationale in the denial letter and then another completely 
different (presumably stronger) rationale when challenged before 
the court. Under the no-alternative rule, the board would have a 
much broader field of possible arguments to make when the 
denial is challenged in court. Moreover, service providers would 
                                                                                                     
significant gap in service is the least intrusive on the values that the denial 
sought to serve.’” (quoting APT Pittsburgh Ltd. P’ship v. Penn Twp., 196 F.3d 
469, 480 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 167. See supra Part II.A. 
 168. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 495 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
“estoppel” as “[a] bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that 
contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally 
established as true”); id. at 496 (defining “judicial estoppel” as “[e]stoppel that 
prevents a party from contradicting previous declarations made during the same 
or an earlier proceeding if the change in position would adversely affect the 
proceeding or constitute a fraud on the court”). 
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not know what arguments they should expect to face. This all 
gives the locality an unfair tactical advantage. That is, unless the 
zoning board is required to continue to rely on the same rationale 
they purported to use, as the least-intrusive rule does. 
Finally, the least-intrusive rule is preferable to the no-
alternative rule because it fits better with the overall structure of 
the Act, particularly how it leaves most of the substantive 
decisionmaking in the hands of the local zoning boards. Under 
§ 332(c)(7), the court’s role is not necessarily to delve into the 
substance of the underlying zoning decision. Instead, the court is 
simply to make sure that the local zoning authority has complied 
with the limitations stated in § 332(c)(7)(B),169 namely that the 
local authority has not unreasonably discriminated between 
providers170 and that the zoning board has not instituted a ban or 
effective ban on cellular services.171 If local zoning authority, by 
and large, is to be preserved,172 then the weighing of competing 
options and subjective considerations of feasibility should be done 
at zoning board meetings, not in courtrooms. Instead, the no-
alternative rule invites courts to go beyond the stated reasoning 
of the denial and to consider any and every factor that could help 
the court identify other feasible tower sites.173 At least with the 
                                                                                                     
 169. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v) (2012) (“Any person adversely affected by 
any final action or failure to act by a State or local government . . . that is 
inconsistent with this subparagraph may . . . commence an action in any court of 
competent jurisdiction.”). 
 170. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) (“The regulation of . . . personal wireless service 
facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof . . . shall 
not unreasonably discriminate among providers of functionally equivalent 
services.”). 
 171. See § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (“The regulation of . . . personal wireless service 
facilities by any State or local government or instrumentality thereof . . . shall 
not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless 
services.”). 
 172. See § 332(c)(7)(A) (“Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in 
this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a State or local government or 
instrumentality thereof over decisions regarding the placement, construction, 
and modification of personal wireless service facilities.”). 
 173. See, e.g., MetroPCS, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 400 F.3d 715, 734 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (rejecting a proposed “most acceptable option” rule which operated 
similar to the no-alternative rule, stating that it “seems a hopelessly subjective 
standard, and one wonders how a proposed site could ever be proven ‘the most 
acceptable’ . . . ”). The argument that the Ninth Circuit used to reject the “most 
acceptable option” rule applies just the same to the no-alternative rule. It is an 
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least-intrusive test, the court would be limited in its substantive 
considerations to those on which the zoning board based its 
decision. 
To continue the administrative law analogy from earlier,174 
the substantial evidence standard largely prohibits courts from 
engaging in their own fact-finding, both in the administrative 
context175 and in subsection (B)(v) actions.176 The no-alternative 
rule, which is not limited to the rationale of the denial but open to 
boundless considerations, allows the court to consider evidence 
beyond the record from the zoning board below (that is, the 
denial) and to actively weigh the substantive considerations. This 
would all but require the court to make its own subjective 
judgment calls as to whether there are any other feasible 
alternatives. Under the least-intrusive rule, however, the court is 
limited in its considerations. Just as federal courts in 
administrative review actions are limited to the record that was 
in front of the agency at the time,177 the court in these subsection 
                                                                                                     
open-ended, subjective question that seeks to find one possible site out of vast 
array of options. 
 174. See supra Part II.C. 
 175. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . 
unsupported by substantial evidence in a case . . . reviewed on the record.”); 5 
U.S.C. § 556(e) (“The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all 
papers and requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive record for 
decision.” (emphasis added)); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 
729, 743–44 (1985) (“The task of the reviewing court is to apply the appropriate 
[standard of review] to the agency decision based on the record the agency 
presents to the reviewing court.”); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) 
(“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record 
already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing 
court.”). 
 176. See, e.g., Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 494 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e may neither engage in our own fact-finding nor supplant the 
Town Board’s reasonable determinations.” (citing PrimeCo Pers. Commc’ns, L.P. 
v. Vill. of Fox Lake, F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1998))); T-Mobile Cent., 
LLC v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 546 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“[A] reviewing court has no power to substitute its own conclusions for those of 
the fact-finder.” (citations and quotations omitted)); Ostrow, supra note 48, at 
333 (“Though the substantial evidence standard is less deferential than the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review, it does not substitute local 
judgments with those of the judiciary.”). 
 177. See, e.g., IMS, P.C. v. Alvarez, 129 F.3d 618, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“It is 
a widely accepted principle of administrative law that the courts base their 
review of an agency’s actions on the materials that were before the agency at the 
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(B)(v) actions would be limited to what the board based its 
decision on. 
V. Conclusion 
The siting of cell phone towers—and thus the provision of 
cellular reception generally178—is a collective action problem and, 
in particular, is often fraught with the not-in-my-back-yard 
phenomenon.179 While opposition to a tower in view of one’s 
bedroom window is certainly understandable, so is the desire to 
have cellular reception wherever one goes. In an attempt to 
resolve the underlying tension, Congress adopted the § 332(c)(7) 
tower siting regime which balances the local and national 
interests involved by not directly making siting decisions but 
rather by regulating the overall process.180 One key provision of 
this statutory scheme—subsection (B)(i)(II)—has been plagued 
with three interrelated circuit splits which this Note has 
examined in detail.181 After analysis and critique, this Note has 
concluded that the Fourth Circuit’s blanket-ban rule should be 
rejected because it interprets away half of the clause and renders 
its provisions meaningless. Instead, the general two-pronged 
approach employed by nearly every other circuit should be 
adopted because it provides clear, logical meaning to all of the 
words of the subsection.182 Within this general framework, the 
own-coverage rule, while restricting the local zoning boards’ 
authority with respect to second market entrants, nevertheless 
encourages efficient co-location of multiple carriers on one 
tower—the solution that ultimately achieves both fewer tower 
sites as well as increased reception and market competition.183 
Finally, the least-intrusive rule is preferable to the no-alternative 
rule because it focuses the litigation specifically on why the 
zoning board made their decision rather than opening the judicial 
                                                                                                     
time its decision was made.” (citations omitted)). 
 178. See supra note 1. 
 179. See supra Part II.A. 
 180. See supra Part II.B. 
 181. See supra Part III. 
 182. See supra Part IV.A. 
 183. See supra Part IV.B. 
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proceedings so wide as to allow the court to substitute their own 
substantive decision; also, concerns regarding judicial economy 
and tactical equity also favor the least-intrusive rule, as well.184 
Thus, when one considers the text, intent, and underlying policies 
of § 332(c)(7), as well as the practical effects of each of the 
alternatives, the final interpretation of effective prohibition 
under subsection (B)(i)(II) is reached: When a cellular provider 
can show a significant gap in its own coverage and the denied site 
is the least intrusive on the grounds which the denial sought to 
serve, there has been an effective prohibition of cellular services. 
 
                                                                                                     
 184. See supra Part IV.C. 
